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Introduction 
The dearth of ravv data into sentencing practice has long 
been lamented in this jurisdiction, as with many other areas 
of the criminal justice system. 1 Indeed, the paucity of 
infonnation in this area recalls the hitherto neglected issue 
of crime rates in Ireland and its colourful depiction by Brewer 
eta!. as an area where "here be dragons". 2 This phrase, 
employed by latter-day cartographers to mark areas about 
which nothing was known, might well have equal application 
in the area of sentencing. In an etlort to remedy this situation 
to some small extent and gain some insight into sentencing 
practice in the busiest of the criminal courts, the Irish Penal 
Reform Trust ("IPRT") undertook a study into sentencing 
patterns in Dublin District Court during the summer of2003. 
The purpose of this sentencing study was twofold. First, to 
identify how judges use the sentencing options open to 
them and the patterns, if any, in their choices; and, second, 
to determine how often reasons are given for sentences. 
While the IPRT does not purport, as did Brewer et a!. in 
their work on crime levels, to "remove the dragons" in this 
critical area of the criminal justice system, it was hoped that 
the study would, at least, serve to identify the key areas in 
which further research is needed. It is the aim of this article, 
therefore, to analyse the results of the study in the light of 
the available sentencing literature. In accordance \vith the 
IPRT's mandate, the focus will be on the following topics: 
imprisonment; community sentences; fines; inconsistency 
in sentencing; and the right to reasoned sentencing. 
Methodology 
The study was carried out over an eight-week-period 
between June 9, 2003 and July 31, 2003, when two IPRT 
researchers' observed proceedings in the Dublin 
Metropolitan District Court. The majority of this observation 
took place in Courts 44 and 46 at the Bridewell Courts, the 
main "charge sheet courts" for the central Dublin area, 
although the researchers also observed a week of specially 
fixed District Court hearings in Courts 7 and 8, across the 
road from the Bridewell at the Four Courts. During this 
period, the IPRT recorded details and outcomes for 356 
individual defendants. The small sample size of the study 
naturally urges caution in relation to the results but, given 
the paucity of available data on sentencing at this level, the 
IPRT offered this study as a snapshot rather than a complete 
picture of sentencing practice. It was also considered that 
the value of the quantitative research would be significantly 
enhanced by qualitative techniques such as interviews and 
questionnaires with criminal solicitors and court staff. 
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The follovving information was recorded: defendant 
characteristics such as age; sex; nationality; plea; previous 
convictions; the otlence category; and the sentence. The 
individual defendant was taken as the unit of study, not the 
offence. Where defendants were sentenced in respect of 
many otlences, they were coded for the offence related to 
their most serious sentence. The IPRT also took note of 
any verbal reasons given by judges at the time of sentencing. 
The term "verbal reasons" was given a very broad 
definition-anything from a few casual remarks to elaborate 
speeches from the bench were recorded-so long as the 
judge was in some way offering an explanation for imposing 
a particular sentence. 
Findings 
The IPRT found that the most common outcome, 
representing 38 per cent of the defendants sentenced, was 
a dismissal under s.l (I) of the Probation of Offenders Act 
1907, which allows an offender to be left without a 
conviction. Approximately halfofthese cases ( 18 per cent) 
concerned a simple application of s.l (I), while the remainder 
were also required to make a contribution to the Poor Box 
(20 per cent). Heavy use was also made of fines, which were 
the second most frequent outcome (21 per cent). The third 
most common outcome was a strike-out, vvhich is in effect a 
dismissal without prejudice to the re-entry ofthe matter at a 
later date, or a dismissal (acquittal). A custodial sentence 
\Vas imposed in respect of 12 per cent of the study group. 
Community sentences, hO\vever, such as probation bonds 
(I per cent) and community service orders (I per cent), only 
accounted for a very small proportion of the sample 
outcomes. In relation to the sex of the sample group, analysis 
of the defendants in respect of which information was 
available revealed that a strong majority were male (81 per 
cent). Defendants were also predominantly in the younger 
age brackets, with over half of the defendants surveyed 
being in their 20s (55 per cent) and 83 per cent below the 
age of40. 1 
Disappointingly, reasons wen: given by judges for the 
sentence imposed in respect of a mere 32 per cent of cases, 
and this number only climbed to 42 per cent for custodial 
sentences. An examination of the reasons given by the 
sentencingjudges revealed that judges rarely make explicit 
connections between custodial sentences and rationales 
for imprisonment. When judges did speak of rationales, 
however, they demonstrated no coherent policy. 
Researchers observed judges in the Bridewell committing 
offenders to prison for the purpo~es of incapacitation ("! 
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can't let you roam the streets"); deterrence ("you need to 
be taught a lesson"); rehabilitation and retribution. 
ln their interviews, solicitors voiced concerns about the 
lack of accountability of District Court judges. It was felt 
that complaints made to the President of the District Court 
were largely ineffective. Serious concerns were also raised 
about perceived inconsistencies in sentences handed down 
by ditTerent District Court judges. The questionnaires and 
interviews reflected the findings above in that there was a 
feeling that peace bonds, probation bonds and community 
service orders are underused by judges. In relation to fines, 
some solicitors felt that if proper consideration was not 
given to an offender's means a fine could in effect be a 
custodial sentence ''by the back door". Most of the 
interviewees also observed that judges rarely explicitly offer 
reasons for sentencing decisions, even decisions to impose 
custodial sentences, and that this situation should be 
remedied. There was a strong consensus that this would 
result in greater clarity, transparency and consistency in 
sentencing. 
Prison terms 
Although the JPRT recorded the imposition of a custodial 
sentence in respect of 12 per cent of the study group, 
previous studies conducted by O'Mahony' and Bacik ct. 
a/6 into District Court sentencing ha\ e recorded a higher 
rate of imprisonment at approximately 26 per cent and 20 
per cent respectively. Tl~e most recent statistics available 
from the Courts Sen·ice suggest a considerably lower rate 
of approximately 5 per cent of all outcomes, but these 
statistics use the indi' idual offence rather than the offender 
as the base unit of study and are therefore not comparable. 7 
It is also interesting to note that males in their 20s received 
16 of the 43 custodial sentences recorded. While it is diflicult 
to draw firm conclusions from the research in light of the 
small number of those sentenced to imprisonment, this 
finding is consistent with the figures in relation to defendants 
generally, who were mostly male (81 per cent) and belO\\ 
the age of40 (83 per cent). The patterns also find a resonance 
in Bacik et a!. 's study, \vhich found that defendants 
appearing belore Dublin District Court are overwhelmingly 
young and male. Analysis of the custodial sentences 
imposed broken down by offence category revealed some 
interesting findings, although the \ ery small number of 
dcf'endants within the assault and drugs categories may 
have ske\\ ed some of the results. Assault com ictions lt;d 
to custodial sentences in the highest percentage of cases 
( 43 per cent) followed by drugs (25 per cent) and property 
oirences (24 per cent). Offenders sentenced in respect of 
public order otTenccs only made up 6 per cent of those 
sentenced to imprisonment. a figure \\hich again tallies with 
Bacik eta!. \study. 
lt is also notable that the custodial sentences imposed 
were typically for very short periods of six months or less 
(63 per cent). This reliance on short sentences of 
imprisonment accords with previous research in the field. 
Writing in 2001, 0' Donnell compared Irish prison profiles 
with those of other European countries, and observed that 
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"[in Ireland] the average prison sentence is short (2.5 
months). Generally speaking one in every three committals 
is for less than three months, the majority are for less than 
six months and three quarters are tor less than one year. "X 
This feature of Irish sentencing practice is also borne out 
by the most recent figures available from the Prison Service 
on committals under sentence.'' As in previous years, the 
category of sentences of less than three months continued 
to account for the highest proportion of all sentences, at 
38.5 per cent. It barely needs restating that short prison 
terms are a particularly pointless form of imprisonment. 
placing a huge strain on penal resources yet with minimal 
deterrent or rehabilitative effect on the offender. 1° Further, 
the over-reliance on short sentences calls into serious 
question the extent to which the principle of detention as 
last resort, recently given statutory expression in the 
Children Act 2001, 11 is adhered to by judges. The prevalence 
of short terms of imprisonmem \Yould suggest, however, 
that Ireland is a jurisdiction with great potential for the use 
of non-custodial sanctions as a means of reducing the 
prison population. 
Community sentences 
The results of the study were disappointing in this regard, 
with only 2 per cent of the offenders surveyed receiving a 
community sentence of either a probation order or 
community service order. While again it must be emphasised 
that these figures are offender rather than offence based, 
this lo\\ figure is in line with court statistics on sentencing 
in the District Court in the most recent Courts Sen·ice Annual 
Report which use the otTence as their base unit of study. 
Only 2,883, or 0.7 per cent. of the 374,944 summary offences 
and indictable offences dealt \\ith summarily in the District 
Court in 2003 were finalised by means of a community service 
order. 1' Community service orders arc a practical and cheaper 
alternative to imprisonment and haYe been praised for their 
reparative element and the increased sense of personal 
responsibility developed by offenders. Further, community 
sen ice orders tend to be fully performed. In a submission 
to the Law Reform Commission, the Probation and Welfare 
Sen·ice indicated that the completion rate for the orders 
was consistently high at 83 per cent. 1' It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that both the Law Reform Commission 14 and the 
Whitaker Committce 15 ha\e recommended the fullest 
possible use of the community sen· ice order. Indeed, the 
underuse of community service in this jurisdiction can be 
contrasted "ith the position in other European countries, 
such as Finland, which have fully realised its potential as 
an altcrnati\'e to custody. In Finland, it is usual that courts 
com·ert unconditional prison sentences of up to eight 
months into community service of between 20 and 200 hours 
unless there are good reasons for not doing so. 1'' This 
approach, along with other systematic policy choices, 
succeeded in reducing the finnish rate of imprisonment 
from 187 per I 00,000 in the 1950s (one of the highest in 
Western Europe) to 55 in 2000. 
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The problem is compounded by the fact that the use of 
community service as a sanction would appear to be in 
decline. The Expert Group on the Probation and Welfare 
Service, in its Final Report, has observed a significant 
decrease in the number of community service orders made 
by the courts since the mid-l990s and attributes this in 
part to the "perceived lack of suitability of community service 
for oftenders with addictions". 17 This development appears 
to have led the Expert Group to recommend that such orders 
should also be available as a sanction in their own right, 
thereby removing the requirement that, prior to imposing a 
community sentence order, a judge must be satisfied that 
the offence is one which would warrant a custodial 
sentence. 18 Such a recommendation is surprising in light of 
the Expert Group's recognition earlier in the Report of the 
dangers of "up-tariffing" or "net widening" .1') This 
phenomenon can be described as a process whereby 
successive alternatives to custody simply become 
alternatives to alternatives, and has proved a significant 
limitation on the effectiveness of non-custodial alternatives 
in other jurisdictions. This has the effect of escalating some 
offenders, such as those who would have received a fine or 
other lesser sentence, up the sentencing ladder and bringing 
more people within the "net" of the correctional system. It 
is salutary to note the English experience in particular. What 
Ashworth 211 has termed the "policy of proliferation", or the 
increast: in the range of alternative sentences available to 
the courts, has not met with success in tenns of its impact 
on the use of custody, which has remained unchanged . 
Increased discretion in the area of community service orders 
is therefore unlikely to have an impact on the use of custody 
by the courts, but may instead replace other community 
penalties such as the probation order or the fine. It is 
submitted that the removal of this important condition 
precedent in the legislation should be forestalled in the 
absence oflrish research on the problem ofup-tarit11ng. 
Probation orders or bonds \Vere also under used 
sanctions. A probation order denotes a conditional 
discharge on entering into a recognisance to keep the peace 
and be of good behaviour while under the supervision of a 
Probation Officer for a tixed period not exceeding three 
years. Under the Probation of Offenders Act 1907, as 
amended, such conditions may also be included in the order 
as the court considers necessary, for example, residence in 
a certain place. 21 No research has been conducted into the 
effectiveness of probation orders in this jurisdiction, but 
research in England indicates a consistently high rate of 
completion of over 80 per cent for many years. 22 As 
Ashworth2' notes, this is probably a more reliable measure 
of success or failure than the reconviction rate and should 
be vie\\cd against the considerable social disadvantages 
experienced by those on probation. Support for such 
measures within the Probation and Welfare Service itself 
was also observed by the Law Reform Commission in its 
Report on Sentencing. The Commission noted, "the 
e:perience of officers working in the courts is that a 
Significant number of people who are placed on probation 
do nut make further court appearances."24 
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In considering how to make optimum use of this 
alternative, it is interesting to note that the Whitaker 
Committee recommended, over 20 years ago, that a 
probation report should be mandatory where a court is 
contemplating a prison sentence, unless the judge is 
prepared to state in writing the reasons why it is judged 
undesirable or unnecessary in a particular case. 25 In the 
view of the Committee, this would "ensure the court was in 
possession of all relevant facts about the offender and that, 
therefore, the court's ultimate disposal of the case would 
have as much regard for the offender as the offence" .26 
While laudable, this would necessarily require expansion 
and increased fimding of the Probation and Welfare Service, 
which has been beleaguered by resource and staffing 
shortages for many years now.27 Given that the deficit in 
staftlng of the service has "got worse, not better"28 since 
the Whitaker Committee reported in 1985, this issue must 
must be addressed as a matter of priority prior to reform in 
this direction. 
Fines 
Fines represented a heavily used non-custodial alternative 
in the IPRT's study, representing 21 per cent of all recorded 
outcomes. This figure broadly corresponds with the latest 
statistics available from the Courts Service, which indicate 
that fines represent 28 per cent of all sentencing outcomes.29 
As the sub-committee on Crime and Punishment has 
observed, however, District Court judges compare 
unfavourably to magistrates in England in their use of fines, 
particularly in respect of indictable offences.30 While the 
significant use of fines by judges as an alternative to 
imprisonment is laudable, it should not be forgotten that 
this sentence currently carries with it the risk of several 
days imprisonment in default. Indeed, fine defaulters 
represent a significant percentage of all committals under 
sentence to prison in any given year. In 200 I, for example, 
1 ,204 persons were committed for non-payment of fines, 
amounting to 23 per cent of all committals.11 The risk of 
custody is considerably increased if the fine imposed is not 
adjusted according to an offender's means, a concern which 
came to the fore during the questionnaires and interviews 
with criminal solicitors. One solicitor described as 
"disquieting" situations whereby homeless persons who 
are fined for a minor offence which does not attract a term 
of imprisonment are in effect being sentenced to 
imprisonment on account of their inability to pay. This is 
particularly disconcerting given the fact that there is an 
existing statutory obligation on District Court judges under 
the Criminal Justice Administration Act 191432 to consider 
an offender's means prior to imposing a fine. The sub-
committee on Crime and Punishment has expressed concern 
at the current system of fining and has made a number of 
recommendations in this regard which are respectfully 
adopted here. One of the most important is that there should 
be a titll means enquiry in every case where a financial 
penalty is being considered and, as a general rule, fines 
should be payable within one year. 13 The committee also 
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recommended that measures other than imprisonment 
should be available in the event of default, such as 
community service or a suspended committal.14 This 
proposal merits serious consideration in light of the fact 
that imprisonment is much more severe than the offender's 
original penaltyY 
Inconsistencies 
Inconsistencies were observed by IPRT researchers, who 
witnessed very different outcomes for cases with very 
similar factual matrices. One researcher summarised his 
observations, thus: 
"A common scenario: a young man in his 20s 
is convicted of a s.4 public order offence 
[breach of the peace] in connection with late-
night roaring on O'Connell street; he gives 
no trouble to the gardai and has no previous 
convictions .... IPRT observed that [this] 
typical defendant may, depending on the 
judge, solicitor, and the atmosphere of the 
court, receive any of the following: a 
straightforward application of s.l ( 1) [of the 
Probation Act], resulting in no recorded 
conviction; an application of s.l ( 1) with a 
charitable donation of 50, I 00 or 200 euro; or 
a fine with a conviction recorded, ranging from 
50 to 400 euro." 
The significant point in respect of the above observation is 
of course the effect on the defendant. For the same minor 
offence, the penalty ranged from a simple reprimand to a 
recorded conviction that restricts employment opportunities 
and may expose an impecunious offender to the risk of 
imprisonment. This divergence of approach also extended 
to the amount of the fine or contribution. In relation to 
defendants convicted of offences under both s.4 
(intoxication in a public place) and s.6 (breach of the peace) 
of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994, the highest 
charitable contribution ordered was €500, ten times higher 
than the lowest at €50. The impression of inconsistency 
formed by the IPRT researchers was affirmed in interviews 
with solicitors who appear frequently in the Bridewell Courts. 
In relation to dismissals under s.l ( 1) of the Probation Act 
1967, solicitors indicated that judges vary considerably in 
their criteria of application. For example, some judges felt it 
should be confined purely to summary matters, such as 
public order offences, whilst others felt it could also be 
applied to indictable offences triable summarily such as 
theft. More generally, the solicitors voiced serious concerns 
about inconsistencies and noted a marked failure by judges 
to align their approaches to sentencing as a body. The 
resultant uncertainty has lead to solicitors strategising on 
behalf of their clients. As one interviewee remarked, 
"differing practices between judges definitely leads to judge-
shopping. Some judges known for leniency end up with 
busy lists." 
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Regrettably, no comprehensive research study has been 
carried out into this important aspect of sentencing practice. 
Specific studies on particular aspects of the sentencing 
system, however, shed some light on the problem. Walsh 
and Sexton's36 study into community service orders, for 
example, revealed considerable variations between judges 
both in relation to the average length of community service 
orders imposed and the average length of the alternatin: 
prison term imposed. As Bacik37 notes, this is disturbing in 
an area where detailed legislative provision already exists 
and raises questions as to the extent of disparity in other 
areas which are not similarly regulated. The Law Reform 
Commission has also observed significant variation in the 
application of the Poor Box in its recent Consultation Paper 
on the topic: "[i]t is undoubtedly true that the court poor 
box is not applied to an equal extent by judges. Some judges 
do not apply the court poor box at all. Other judges apply it 
to varying degrees."38 The Law Reform Commission noted 
two cases reported in the Irish Times where co-defendants 
charged with the same offence received different 
sentcnces. 39 Some were fined. while others were ordered to 
contribute to the Poor Box and thus avoided a conviction. 
A valuable contribution has also been made to existing 
research in this area by a study carried out for a recent RTE 
Primetime programme on sentencing in the District Court. 40 
The results of the study were collated from over 1,000 
provincial newspaper court reports of sentences imposed 
by various District Court judges in the first half of 2004. 
While conceding that their methods were "not scientific", 
Primetime found startling disparities between judges in 
relation to many of the most common sentencing disposals, 
revealing what criminologist Paul O'Mahony described on 
the programme as "an intolerable level of inconsistency". 
Overall, the harshest judge imprisoned offenders in almost 
40 per cent of the reported cases, which was 12 times as 
many as the most lenient sentencer, \Vho imposed a custodial 
sentence on just over 3 per cent of offenders. Nationally, 
the average fine for all offences was around €300, but the 
harshest judge averaged €700, over five times the most 
lenient whose fines averaged €130. In relation to the Poor 
Box, the research supported the concerns expressed by the 
Law Reform Commission, with one judge applying it in 52 
per cent of all his reported cases and other judges never 
using it at all. 
The research also served to highlight considerable 
disparities between judges in different districts, creating an 
impression of a "geographical lottery". In this regard, 
Primetime examined figures from the Courts Service Annual 
Report 2003 which were based on recent computer records 
from a pilot scheme in Dublin and Limerick District Courts. 41 
A comparison of the rates of imprisonment between the 
two cities, revealed an 80 per cent differential in relation to 
drink driving and public order offences, which were less 
likely to attract a custodial sentence in Dublin,42 while Dublin 
judges jailed twice as many offenders for drugs offences. 41 
Whilst the full scale of the problem cannot be known, the 
above research provides some much-needed insight into a 
problem which, as the interviews and questionnaires 
Irish Criminal Law Journal- Volume 15, No.3, 2005 
• 
revealed, is very familiar to practitioners in the criminal 
courts. In the absence of any information on sentencing 
norms, however, and, as will be seen below, a common 
sentencing rationale, it is difficult to criticise judges for 
such divergence of approach. It is clear, however, that this 
is an area which would benefit greatly from further research. 
The right to reasons 
The research revealed that under half of those offenders 
imprisoned were given a reason for their detention, resulting 
in a majority of offenders going trom the courtroom to prison 
w·ithout an understanding of the factors motivating the 
judge's decision. In this regard it should be remembered 
that the IPRT coded any remark made by a judge in relation 
to his or her sentencing decision as a "reason".44 Some 58 
per cent ofjudges, however, failed to meet even this low 
standard. This is clearly a highly unsatisfactory state of 
affairs and one which offends basic principles of natural 
justice, particularly when the effect of the decision in 
question is the deprivation of an otlender's liberty for a 
period of up to 12 months. 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the creation 
of a statutory obligation on District Court judges to give 
written reasons for a decision to sentence an otlender to a 
term of imprisonment, as recommended by the Law Reform 
Commission, is overdue. In its 2003 Report on Penaltiesfor 
1'vfinor Offences. 45 the Law Reform Commission 
recommended that District Court judges give brief written 
reasons, outlining the aggravating and mitigating factors 
intluencing the decision, with particular emphasis on why 
the non-custodial options available to the judge were not 
appropriate. The Report explored in considerable detail the 
policy arguments in favour of reasoned decision-making in 
sentencing such as increased transparency and 
accountability in sentencing, leading to increased public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Most importantly, 
the Law Reform Commission felt that a duty to give reasons 
tor a decision would lead to more considered legal decisions. 
In this relation, O'Donnell has remarked, "[it] would force 
the consideration and reasoned elimination of each 
alternative measure before a prison sentence was imposed. 
It is possible that such a process of deliberation vvould, of 
itself, reduce the usc ofimprisonment."4" Overall, reasons 
ensure that justice is both done and seen to be done by the 
defendant and the community at large. It is noteworthy that 
in recent years in England and Wales both statute and case-
la\v has imposed a duty to give reasons tor sentence in an 
increasing number of situations. The most significant of 
these measures is s.l ofthc Criminal Justice Act I 991 which 
requires a judge to specify in open court the criterion upon 
which a custodial sentence is based and furthermore to 
explain this to the otlender in ordinary language. 47 Under 
the Magistrates' Court Sentencing Guidelines, magistrates 
in England arc also required to give reasons tor sentence.4g 
The second plank of the La\v Retorm Commission's 
argument rested on the fact that the recommendation is 
"merely an aspect of the general constitutional and human 
rights obligation to give reasons for a decision". ln this 
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relation, it is surprising to note that the constitutional 
jurisprudence in relation to a judicial duty to give reasons 
is underdeveloped, with the case-law focusing on the 
obligation on administrative bodies to give reasons in 
accordance with the dictates of natural and constitutional 
justice.49 Further, statute has now intervened in the form of 
the Freedom of Information Act 1997 imposing extensive 
duties on public bodies to give reasons. In relation to the 
judicial duty to give reasons, on the other hand, the high-
water mark was reached in the Supreme Court case of 
0 'Mahony v Judge Thomas Ballagh and the DPP 50 In 
0 'Mahony, the Supreme Court held that a District Court 
judge had "fallen into a unconstitutionality" in failing to 
rule on the submissions made by counsel and to give 
reasons for his ruling. While the Commission may be correct 
in their argument that "from this position it is only a few 
steps further to impose a requirement that the reasons tor a 
judge's decision to impose a custodial sentence are recorded 
[even in the absence of such submissions]", it seems highly 
incongruous that administrative bodies are mandated by 
case-law and statute to give reasons for their decisions 
while a similar onus is not placed on sentencers making 
decisions in relation to a citizen's liberty. Ashworth makes 
the point that "it is a fundamental tenet of natural justice 
that decision-makers should give reasons for their decision, 
and the argument is surely at its strongest where the 
decisions affect the liberty of the subject. The case for 
reasoned decision in sentencing is therefore unanswerable 
in principle." 51 
Further, the requirements of natural and constitutional 
justice are now to some extent overlaid by the fair trial 
provisions ofArt.6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Under s.2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act 2003, domestic law must be interpreted in the 
light of this Article and the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. As noted by the Law Retorm Commission, 
the case-law is quite robust in this area and requires a court 
to give reasons for its judgment in both civil and criminal 
matters.51 Further, the extent of the duty may vary according 
to the nature of the decision and the circumstances of the 
case, so that the more grave the consequences of a decision 
the greater the obligation to give reasons. 53 It follows that 
in the context of a criminal case where the defendant is in 
peril of imprisonment, the obligation on a sentencing judge 
to give reasons must be considerable. 
The Commission's proposal has been rejected by the 
Working Group on the Jurisdiction of the Courts in their 
Report on the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts. 54 The 
Group's criticisms fall into two broad categories: first, that 
the imposition of such a duty is unnecessary as "the reasons 
for a particular sentence will often be apparent ... and in 
eftect the parties will both know and understand the issues", 
and second, that the recording of written reasons would be 
both "onerous and time consuming" and therefore quite 
simply impracticable. With respect, however, these 
arguments fail to thoroughly convince. As anyone who has 
paid even a t1eeting visit to the District Court will know, the 
reasons for a decision made in the noisy, pressurised 
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environment of the District Court will only be obvious to 
someone who is familiar with the unspoken language of the 
court. A solicitor or barrister who is managing a busy list, or 
who is simply indifferent, cannot be relied upon to 
communicate the reasons for a sentence to his or her client. 
Arguments on the grounds of practicality were 
considered by the Law Reform Commission in its report, 
but ultimately dismissed on the basis that the right to 
effective reasons in a case where an individual's liberty is 
at stake should be not be sacrificed at the altar of 
administrative convenience. It is simply not acceptable to 
say to offenders "we cannot explain the factors motivating 
our decision to imprison you in any level of detail (if indeed, 
at all) because we do not have the staff/time/resources to 
do so".lt should, further, be remembered that a judge would 
only be required to record the reasons for his or her decision 
where a custodial sentence was imposed. In the study 
conducted by the IPRT, this would have meant a brief note 
of the main aggravating and mitigating factors in 
approximately one in every eight cases. 
Mention should also be made here of the mixed 
rationales for sentencing observed by the IPRT researchers. 
References in passing sentence to deterrent, incapacitative, 
rehabilitative and retributive principles, led the IPRT to 
conclude that there is no shared understanding among 
District Court judges as to what prison can accomplish. 
Mixed motives were also apparent in an earlier survey of 
judicial attitudes to sentencing conducted by the IPRT, 55 
where District Court judges acknowledged that rationales 
differed between judges but exhibited a preference for 
principles of deterrence and incapacitation. The Law Reform 
Commission, on the other hand, recommended the adoption 
of a "just desserts" or retributive model of sentencing, which 
means that the sentence should generally reflect the 
seriousness of the crime. 56 Even the Law Reform 
Commission could not reach unanimity on this issue, 
however, with a minority favouring a more rehabilitative 
approach. ln the absence of a clear statutory rationale for 
sentencing or guidance from the appellate courts on this 
central problematic, it is difficult to see how issues 
discussed above such as inconsistency and the appropriate 
use of alternatives to custody can be fully addressed. 
Recommendations 
In light of the above, the IPRT makes the following 
recommendations: 
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The fullest possible use should be made of 
existing measures such as community 
service orders (CSOs) and probation orders. 
This should be facilitated by increased 
resourcing of the Probation and Welfare 
Service. With a progressive strengthening 
ofthe Service, consideration should also be 
given to the introduction of a requirement 
that a probation report must be obtained by 
a judge prior to imposing a custodial 
sentence. 
• 
In light of the problem of up-tariffing, 
research into sentencing practices is needed 
prior to the expansion of alternatives to 
custody or significant alterations to the 
existing scheme, such as those proposed by 
the Expert Group of the Probation and 
Welfare Service in relation to community 
service orders. It is important to distinguish 
reliance on non-custodial alternatives from 
mere proliferation of such sanctions. As 
shown in countries such as Finland, a small 
group of standard penalties with powers of 
substitution may prove more effective. 
In line with the recommendations of the sub-
committee on Crime and Punishment, there 
should be a full means enquiry in every case 
where a financial penalty is being considered 
and, as a general rule, fines should be 
payable within one year. Consideration 
should be given to imposition of a CSO or 
suspended sentence as a response to 
default on payment of a fine. 
Further research to "remove the dragons" 
in relation to sentencing practice in the 
District Court should be commissioned, 
particularly research into inconsistencies in 
sentencing. 
The creation of a sentencing database and 
a set of non-statutory guidelines to assist 
judges with sentencing merits serious 
consideration, as recommended by the Law 
Reform Commission in its Report on 
Sentencing. 
District Court judges should be required 
under statute to give written reasons for a 
decision to sentence an offender to a term 
of imprisonment, as recommended by the 
Law Reform Commission in its Report on 
Penalties for Minor Offences. 
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